

# Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction

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**Abstract.** A classical trading experiment consists of a set of unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers with identical items. Each agent’s value or opportunity cost for the item is their private information and preferences are quasi-linear. Trade between agents employs a double oral auction (DOA) in which both buyers and sellers call out bids or offers which an auctioneer recognizes. Transactions resulting from accepted bids and offers are recorded. This continues until there are no more acceptable bids or offers. Remarkably, the experiment consistently terminates in a Walrasian price. The main result of this paper is a mechanism in the spirit of the DOA that converges to a Walrasian equilibrium in a polynomial number of steps, thus providing a theoretical basis for the above-described empirical phenomenon. It is well-known that computation of a Walrasian equilibrium for this market corresponds to solving a maximum weight bipartite matching problem. The uncoordinated but rational responses of agents thus solve in a distributed fashion a maximum weight bipartite matching problem that is encoded by their private valuations. We show, furthermore, that every Walrasian equilibrium is reachable by some sequence of responses. This is in contrast to the well known auction algorithms for this problem which only allow one side to make offers and thus essentially choose an equilibrium that maximizes the surplus for the side making offers. Our results extend to the setting where not every agent pair is allowed to trade with each other.

## 1 Introduction

Chamberlin reported on the results of a market experiment in which prices failed to converge to a Walrasian equilibrium [5]. Chamberlin’s market was an instance of the assignment model with homogeneous goods. There is a set of unit demand buyers and a set of unit supply sellers, and all items are identical. Each agent’s value or opportunity cost for the good is their private information and preferences are quasi-linear. Chamberlin concluded that his results showed competitive theory to be inadequate. Vernon Smith, in an instance of insomnia, recounted in [18] demurred:

“The thought occurred to me that the idea of doing an experiment was right, but what was wrong was that if you were going to show that competitive equilibrium was not realizable . . . you should choose an institution of exchange that

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might be more favorable to yielding competitive equilibrium. Then when such an equilibrium failed to be approached, you would have a powerful result. This led to two ideas: (1) why not use the double oral auction procedure, used on the stock and commodity exchanges? (2) why not conduct the experiment in a sequence of trading days in which supply and demand were renewed to yield functions that were daily flows?"

Instead of Chamberlin's unstructured design, Smith used a double oral auction (DOA) scheme in which both buyers and sellers call out bids or offers which an auctioneer recognizes [17]. Transactions resulting from accepted bids and offers are recorded. This continues until there are no more acceptable bids or offers. At the conclusion of trading, the trades are erased, and the market reopens with valuations and opportunity costs unchanged. The only thing that has changed is that market participants have observed the outcomes of the previous days trading and may adjust their expectations accordingly. This procedure was iterated four or five times. Smith was astounded: "I am still recovering from the shock of the experimental results. The outcome was unbelievably consistent with competitive price theory." [18](p. 156)

As noted by Daniel Friedman [8], the results in [17], replicated many times, are something of a mystery. How is it that the agents in the DOA overcome the impediments of both *private information* and *strategic uncertainty* to arrive at the Walrasian equilibrium? A brief survey of the various (early) theoretical attempts to do so can be found in Chapter 1 of [8]. Friedman concluded his survey of the theoretical literature with a two-part conjecture. "First, that competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium coincides with ordinary (complete information) Nash Equilibrium (NE) in interesting environments for the DOA institution. Second, that the DOA promotes some plausible sort of learning process which eventually guides the *both clever and not-so-clever* traders to a behavior which constitutes an 'as-if' complete-information NE."

Over the years, the first part of Friedman's conjecture has been well studied (see, e.g., [7]) but the second part of the conjecture is still left without a satisfying resolution. The focus of this paper is on the second part of Friedman's conjecture. More specifically, we design a mechanism which simulates the DOA, and prove that this mechanism always converges to a Walrasian equilibrium in polynomially many steps. Our mechanism captures the following four key properties of the DOA.

1. *Two-sided market*: Agents on either side of the market can make actions.
2. *Private information*: When making actions, agents have no other information besides their own valuations and the bids and offers submitted by others.
3. *Strategic uncertainty*: The agents have the freedom to choose their actions modulo mild rationality conditions.
4. *Arbitrary recognition*: The auctioneer (only) recognizes bids and offers in an *arbitrary* order.

Among these four properties, mechanisms that allow agents on either side to make actions (*two-sided market*) and/or limit the information each agent

has (*private information*) have received more attention in the literature (see Section 1.1). However, very little is known for mechanisms that both work for strategically uncertain agents and recognize agents in an arbitrary order. Note that apart from resolving the second part of Friedman’s conjecture, having a mechanism with these four properties itself is of great interest for multiple reasons. First, in reality, the agents are typically unwilling to share their private information to other agents or the auctioneer. Second, agents naturally prefer to act freely as oppose to being given a procedure and merely following it. Third, in large scale distributed settings, it is not always possible to find a real auctioneer who is trusted by every agent, and is capable of performing massive computation on the data collected from all agents. In the DOA (or in our mechanism) however, the auctioneer only recognizes actions in an arbitrary order, which can be replaced by any standard distributed token passing protocol, where an agent can take an action only when he is holding the token. In other words, our mechanism serves more like a platform (rather than a specific protocol) where rational agents always reach a Walrasian equilibrium no matter their actual strategy. To the best of our knowledge, no previous mechanism enables such a ‘platform-like’ feature. In the rest of this section, we summarize our results and discuss in more detail the four properties of the DOA in context of previous work.

### 1.1 Our Results and Related Work

We design a mechanism that simulates the DOA by simultaneously capturing two-sided market, private information, strategic uncertainty, and arbitrary recognition. More specifically, following the DOA, at each iteration of our mechanism, the auctioneer maintains a list of active price submission and a tentative assignment of buyers to sellers that ‘clears’ the market at the current prices (note that this can also be distributedly maintained by the agents themselves). Among the agents who wish to make or revise an earlier submission, an arbitrary one is recognized by the auctioneer and a new tentative assignment is formed. An agent can submit *any* price that strictly improves his payoff given the current submissions (rather than being forced to make a ‘best’ response, which is to submit the price that maximizes payoff). We show that as long as agents make myopically better responses, the market always converges to a Walrasian equilibrium in polynomial number of steps. Furthermore, *every* Walrasian equilibrium is the limit of some sequence of better responses. We should remark that the fact that an agent always improves his payoff does not imply that the total payoff of all agents always increases. For instance, a buyer can increase his payoff by submitting a higher price and ‘stealing’ the current match of some other buyer (whose payoff would drop).

To the best of our knowledge, no existing mechanism captures all four properties for the DOA that we proposed in this paper. For most of the early work on auction based algorithms (e.g., [16, 12, 6, 7, 2]), unlike the DOA, only one side of the market can make offers. By permitting only one side of the market to make offers, the auction methods essentially pick the Walrasian equilibrium (equilibria are not unique) that maximizes the total surplus of the side making the offers.

For two-sided auction based algorithms [4, 3], along with the ‘learning’ based algorithms studied more recently [13, 10], agents are required to follow a specific algorithm (or protocol) that determines their actions (and hence violates strategic uncertainty). For example, [4] requires that when an agent is activated, a buyer always matches to the ‘best’ seller and a seller always matches to the ‘best’ buyer (i.e., agents only make myopically *best* responses, which is not the case for the DOA). [10] has agents submit bids based on their current best alternative offer and prices are updated according to a common formula relying on knowledge of the agents opportunity costs and marginal values. [13], though not requiring agents to always make myopically best responses, has agents follow a specific (randomized) algorithm to submit conditional bids and choose matches. We should emphasize that agents acting based on some *random* process is different from agents being strategically uncertain. In particular, for the participants of the original DOA experiment (of [17]), there is no a priori reason to believe that they were following some specific random procedure during the experiment. On the contrary, as stated in Friedman’s conjecture, there are *clever and not-so-clever* participants, and hence different agents could have completely different strategies and their strategies might even change when, for instance, seeing more agents matching with each other, or by observing the strategies of other agents. Therefore, analyzing a process where agents are strategically uncertain can be distinctly more complex than analyzing the case where agents behave in accordance with a well-defined stochastic process. In this paper, we consider an extremely general model of the agents: the agents are acting arbitrarily while only following some mild rationality conditions. Indeed, proving fast convergence (or even just convergence) for a mechanism with agents that are strategically uncertain is one of the main challenges of this work.

Arbitrary recognition is another critical challenge for designing our mechanism. For example, the work of [14, 13] deploys randomization in the process of recognizing agents. This is again in contrast to the original DOA experiment, since the auctioneer did not use a randomized procedure when recognizing actions, and it is unlikely that the participants *decide* to make an action following some random process (in fact, some participants might be more ‘active’ than others, which could lead to the ‘quieter’ participants barely getting *any* chance to make actions, as long as the ‘active’ agents are still making actions).

The classical work on the *stable matching* problem [9] serves as a very good illustration for the importance of arbitrary recognition. Knuth [11] proposed the following algorithm for finding a stable matching. Start with an arbitrary matching; if it is stable, stop; otherwise, pick a blocking pair and match them; repeat this process until a stable matching is found. Knuth showed that the algorithm could cycle if the blocking pair is picked *arbitrarily*. Later, [15] showed that picking the blocking pairs at random suffices to ensure that the algorithm eventually converges to a stable matching, which suggests that it is the arbitrary selection of blocking pairs that causes Knuth’s algorithm to not converge.

The setting of Knuth’s algorithm is very similar to the process of the DOA in the sense that in any step of the DOA, a temporary matching is maintained and

agents can make actions to (possibly) change the current matching. But perhaps surprisingly, we show that arbitrary recognition does not cause the DOA to suffer from the same cycling problem as Knuth’s algorithm. The main reason, or the main difference between the two models is that our assignment model involves both matching and prices, while Knuth’s algorithm only involves matchings. As a consequence, in our mechanism, the preferences of the agents change over time (since an agent always favors the better price submission, the preferences could change when new prices are submitted). In the instance that leads Knuth’s algorithm to cycle (see [11]), the fundamental cause is that the preferences of *all* agents form a cycle. However, in our mechanism, preferences (though changing) are always consistent for all agents.

Based on this observation, we establish the limit of the DOA by introducing a small friction into the market: restricting the set of agents on the other side that each agent can trade with<sup>1</sup>. We show that in this case, there is an instance with a specific adversarial order of recognizing agents such that following this order, the preferences of the agents (over the entire order) form a cycle and the DOA may never converge. Finally, we complete the story by showing that if we change the mechanism to recognize agents randomly, with high probability, a Walrasian equilibrium will be reached in polynomial number of steps. This further emphasizes the distinction between random recognition and arbitrary recognition for DOA-like mechanisms.

**Organization:** The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the model of the market and develop some concepts and notation used throughout the paper. Our main results are presented in Section 3. We describe our DOA style mechanism and show that in markets with no trading restrictions, it converges in a number of steps polynomial in the number of agents. We then show that when each agent is restricted to trade only with an arbitrary subset of agents on the other side, the mechanism need not converge. A randomized variant of our mechanism is then presented to overcome this issue. Finally, we conclude with some directions for future work in Section 4.

## 2 Preliminaries

We will use the terms ‘player’ and ‘agent’ interchangeably throughout the paper. We use  $B$  to represent a buyer,  $S$  for a seller, and  $Z$  for either of them. Also,  $b$  is used as the bid submitted by a buyer and  $s$  as the offer from a seller.

**Definition 1 (Market).** *A market is denoted by  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, val)$ , where  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$  are the sets of buyers and sellers, respectively. Each buyer  $B \in \mathcal{B}$  is endowed with a valuation of the item, and each seller  $S \in \mathcal{S}$  has an opportunity cost for the item. We slightly abuse the terminology and refer to both of these values as*

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<sup>1</sup> In Chamberlin’s experiment, buyers and sellers had to seek each other out to determine prices. This search cost meant that each agent was not necessarily aware of all prices on the other side of the market.

the valuation of the agent for the item. The valuation of any agent  $Z$  is chosen from range  $[0, 1]$ , and denoted by  $val(Z)$ . Finally,  $E$  is the set of undirected edges between  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$ , which determines the buyer-seller pairs that may trade.

Let  $m = |E|$  and  $n = |\mathcal{B}| + |\mathcal{S}|$ .

**Definition 2 (Market State).** The state of a market at time  $t$  is denoted  $\mathcal{S}^t(P^t, \Pi^t)$  ( $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  for short, if time is clear or not relevant), where  $P$  is a price function revealing the price submission of each player and  $\Pi$  is a matching between  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$ , indicating which players are currently paired. In other words, the bid (offer) of a buyer  $B$  (seller  $S$ ) is  $P(B)$  ( $P(S)$ ), and  $B, S$  are paired in  $\Pi$  iff  $(B, S) \in \Pi$ . In addition, we denote a player  $Z \in \Pi$  iff  $Z$  is matched with some other player in  $\Pi$ , and denote his match by  $\Pi(Z)$ .

Furthermore, the state where each buyer submits a bid of 0, each seller submits an offer of 1, and no player is matched is called the zero-information state.

We use the term zero-information because no player reveals non-trivial information about his valuation in this state.

**Definition 3 (Valid State).** A state is called valid iff  $(a_1)$  the price submitted by each buyer (seller) is lower (higher) than his valuation,  $(a_2)$  two players are matched only when there is an edge between them, and  $(a_3)$  for any pair in the matching, the bid of the buyer is no smaller than the offer of the seller.

In the following, we restrict attention to states that are valid.

**Definition 4 (Utility).** For a market  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, val)$  at state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$ , the utility of a buyer is defined as  $val(B) - P(B)$ , if  $B$  receives an item, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the utility of a seller is defined as  $P(S) - val(S)$ , if  $S$  trades his item, and zero otherwise.

Note that what we have called utility is also called surplus.

**Definition 5 (Stable State).** A stable state of a market  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, val)$  is a state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  s.t.  $(a_1)$  for all  $(B, S) \in E$ ,  $P(B) \leq P(S)$   $(a_2)$  if  $Z \notin \Pi$ , then  $P(Z) = val(Z)$ , and  $(a_3)$  if  $(B, S) \in \Pi$ , then  $P(B) = P(S)$ .

Suppose  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  is not stable. Then, one of the following must be true.

1. There exists  $(B, S) \in E$  such that  $P(B) > P(S)$ . Then, both  $B$  and  $S$  could strictly increase their utility by trading with each other using the average of their prices.
2. There exists  $Z \notin \Pi$  such that  $P(Z) \neq val(Z)$ . This agent could raise his bid (if a buyer) or lower his offer (if a seller), without reducing his utility and having a better opportunity to trade.
3. There exists  $(B, S) \in \Pi$  such that  $P(B) > P(S)$  ( $P(B) < P(S)$  results in an invalid state). One of the agents could do better by either raising his offer or lowering his bid.

**Definition 6 ( $\varepsilon$ -Stable State).** For any  $\varepsilon \geq 0$ , a state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  of a market  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, \text{val})$  is  $\varepsilon$ -stable iff (a<sub>1</sub>) for any  $(B, S) \in E$ ,  $P(B) - P(S) \leq \varepsilon$  (a<sub>2</sub>) if player  $Z \notin \Pi$ ,  $P(Z) = \text{val}(Z)$ , and (a<sub>3</sub>) if  $(B, S) \in \Pi$ ,  $P(B) = P(S)$ .

Note that the only difference between a stable state and an  $\varepsilon$ -stable state lies in the first property. At any  $\varepsilon$ -stable state, no matched player will have a move to increase his utility by more than  $\varepsilon$ .

**Definition 7 (Social Welfare).** For a market  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, \text{val})$  with a matching  $\Pi$ , the social welfare (SW) of this matching is defined as the sum of the valuation of the matched buyers minus the total opportunity cost of the matched sellers. We denote by  $SW_\Pi$  the SW of matching  $\Pi$ .

**Definition 8 ( $\varepsilon$ -approximate SW).** For any market, a matching  $\Pi$  is said to give an  $\varepsilon$ -approximate SW if  $SW_\Pi \geq SW_{\Pi^*} - n\varepsilon$  for any  $\Pi^*$  that maximizes SW. In other words, on average, the social welfare collected from each player using  $\Pi$  is at most  $\varepsilon$  less than that collected using  $\Pi^*$ .

The following connection between ( $\varepsilon$ -)stable state and ( $\varepsilon$ -approximate) SW is well known in the literature (see the full version [1] Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 for a self contained proof.)

**Theorem 2.1.** For any market  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, \text{val})$ , (a<sub>1</sub>) a state is stable iff it maximizes SW, (a<sub>2</sub>) for any  $\varepsilon > 0$ , any  $\varepsilon$ -stable state realizes an  $\varepsilon$ -approximate SW, and (a<sub>3</sub>) if we define  $\delta = \min\{|\text{val}(Z_1) - \text{val}(Z_2)| \mid Z_1, Z_2 \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{S}, \text{val}(Z_1) \neq \text{val}(Z_2)\}$ , then for  $0 \leq \varepsilon < \delta/n$ , any  $\varepsilon$ -stable state maximizes SW.

### 3 Convergence to a Stable State

We establish our main results in this section. We will start by describing a mechanism in the spirit of DOA, and show that for any *well-behaved* stable state, there is a sequence of agent moves that leads to this state. When the trading graph is a complete bipartite graph, i.e, the case of the DOA experiment, we show that convergence to a stable state occurs in number of steps that is polynomially bounded in the number agents. However, convergence to a stable state is not guaranteed when the trading graph is an incomplete bipartite graph. We propose a natural randomized extension of our mechanism, and show that with high probability, the market will converge to a stable state in number of steps that is polynomially bounded in the number of agents.

#### 3.1 The Main Mechanism

To describe our mechanism, we need the notion of an  $\varepsilon$ -interested player.

**Definition 9 ( $\varepsilon$ -Interested Player).** For a market at state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  with any parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$ , a seller  $S$  is said to be  $\varepsilon$ -interested in his neighbor  $B$  iff either (a)  $P(B) \geq P(S)$  and  $S \notin \Pi$ , or (b)  $P(B) - P(S) \geq \varepsilon$  and  $S \in \Pi$ . The set of buyers interested in a seller  $S$  is defined analogously.

When the parameter  $\varepsilon$  is clear from the context, we will simply refer to an  $\varepsilon$ -interested player as an interested player.

**Mechanism 1** (with input parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$ )

- **Activity Rule:** Among the unmatched buyers, any buyer that neither submits a new higher bid nor has a seller that is interested in him, is labeled as inactive. All other unmatched buyers are labeled as active. An active (inactive) seller is defined analogously. An inactive player changes his status iff some player on the other side matches with him.<sup>2</sup>
- **Minimum Increment:** Each submitted price must be an integer multiple of  $\varepsilon$ .<sup>3</sup>
- **Recognition:** Among all active players, an arbitrary one is recognized.
- **Matching:** After a buyer  $B$  is recognized,  $B$  will choose an interested seller to match with if one exists. If the offer of the seller is lower than the bid  $b$ , it is immediately raised to  $b$ . The seller action is defined analogously.
- **Tie Breaking:** When choosing a player on the other side to match to, an unmatched player is given priority (the unmatched first rule).

In each iteration, players are partitioned into two sets based on whether they are matched or not. The unmatched players are further partitioned into active players and inactive players. The only players with a myopic incentive to revise their submissions are those that are not matched.

Observe that since a buyer will never submit a bid higher than his valuation, and a seller will never make an offer below his own opportunity cost, by submitting only prices that are integer multiples of  $\varepsilon$ , an agent might not be able to submit his true valuation. However, since an agent can always submit a price at most  $\varepsilon$  away from the true valuation, if we pretend that the ‘close to valuation’ prices are true valuations, the maximum SW will decrease by at most  $n\varepsilon$ . By picking  $\varepsilon' = \varepsilon/2$ , if the market converges to an  $\varepsilon'$ -stable state, we still guarantee that the SW of the final state is at most  $n\varepsilon$  away from the maximum SW.

When a buyer  $B$  chooses to increase his current bid: if  $s$  denotes the lowest offer in the neighborhood of  $B$ , and  $s'$  denotes the lowest offer of any unmatched seller in the neighborhood of  $B$ , then the new bid of  $B$  can be at most  $\min\{s + \varepsilon, s'\}$ . We refer to this as the *increment* rule. This may be viewed as a consequence of rationality – there is no incentive for a buyer to bid above the price needed to make a deal with some seller. A similar rule applies to sellers. With a slight abuse of the terminology, we call either rules increment rule. Notice, a player indifferent between submitting a new price and keeping his price unchanged will be assumed to break ties in favor of activity.

Note that the role of the auctioneer in Mechanism (1) is restricted to recognize agent actions, but never select actions for agents. In fact, the existence of an auctioneer is not even necessary for the mechanism to work. Minimum increment can be interpreted as setting the currency of the market to be  $\varepsilon$ . Arbitrary

<sup>2</sup> This is common for eliminating no trade equilibria.

<sup>3</sup> This is part of many experimental implementations of the DOA.



recognition can be achieved by a first come, first served principle. Activity rule and matching are both designed to ensure that players will keep making actions (submitting a new price or forming a valid match) if one exists.

If a state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  satisfies  $\forall (B, S) \in E, P(B) \leq P(S)$ , then we call it a *valid starting state*. It is not difficult to verify the following property of Mechanism (1) (see the full version [1], Claim 4.2 for a detailed discussion).

**Claim 3.1** *For any market, if we use Mechanism (1) and begin with a valid starting state, then any final state of the market is  $\varepsilon$ -stable.*

Note that by Theorem 2.1, if a market converges to an  $\varepsilon$ -stable state, it always realizes  $\varepsilon$ -approximate SW.

**Definition 10 (Well-behaved).** *A stable state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$ , is well-behaved iff  $(a_1)$  for any  $(B, S) \in E$ , if  $B \notin \Pi$  and  $S \notin \Pi$ , then  $P(B) < P(S)$ . An  $\varepsilon$ -stable state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$ , is well-behaved iff not only property  $(a_1)$  is satisfied but also  $(a_2)$  for any  $(B, S) \in E$ , if either  $B \notin \Pi$  or  $S \notin \Pi$ , then  $P(B) \leq P(S)$ .*

Note that the only states that are not well-behaved are the corner cases where a buyer-seller pair having the same valuation (thus having no contribution to SW) are not chosen in the matching, or players who can obtain utility at most  $\varepsilon$  stop attempting to match with others. We establish that any well-behaved ( $\varepsilon$ -stable) state is reachable (see the full version [1], Theorem 4.3 for a proof):

**Theorem 3.2.** *For any  $\varepsilon > 0$ , if we use Mechanism (1), and start from the zero-information state, any well-behaved  $\varepsilon$ -stable state can be reached via a sequence of at most  $n$  moves. Hence, any well-behaved stable state is also reachable.*

### 3.2 Complete Bipartite Graphs

We now prove that market with complete bipartite trading graph will always converge when using Mechanism (1).

**Theorem 3.3.** *For a market whose trading graph is a complete bipartite graph, if we use Mechanism (1) with any input parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$ , and begin with any valid starting state, then the market will converge to an  $\varepsilon$ -stable state after at most  $n^3/\varepsilon$  steps.*

We need the following lemma to prove Theorem 3.3 (see the full version [1], Lemma 4.1 for a proof).

**Lemma 1.** *For a market  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, val)$  whose trading graph is a complete bipartite graph, if we use Mechanism (1) with any input parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$ , then at any state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  reached from a valid starting state, for any  $(B, S) \in E$ , if  $P(B) > P(S)$ , then both  $B$  and  $S$  are matched.*

**Definition 11 ( $\gamma$ -feasible).** *A market state  $\mathcal{S}(P, \Pi)$  is said to be  $\gamma$ -feasible iff there are exactly  $\gamma$  matches in  $\Pi$ .*

*Proof (of Theorem 3.3).* Assume at any time  $t$ , the state  $S^t$  of the market is  $\gamma^t$ -feasible. Define the following potential function

$$\Phi_P = \sum_{S_i \in \mathcal{S}} P(S_i) + \sum_{B_i \in \mathcal{B}} (1 - P(B_i))$$

Note that the value of  $\Phi_P$  is always an integer multiple of  $\varepsilon$ . We will first show that  $\gamma^t$  forms a non-decreasing sequence over time, and then argue that, for any  $\gamma$ , the market can stay in a  $\gamma$ -feasible state for a bounded number of steps. Specifically, we will show that, if  $\gamma$  does not change,  $\Phi_P$  is a non-increasing function and can stay unchanged for at most  $\gamma$  steps. Since the maximum value of  $\Phi_P$  is bounded by  $n$ , it follows that after at most  $(\gamma n)/\varepsilon$  steps, the market moves from a  $\gamma$ -feasible state to a  $(\gamma + 1)$ -feasible state (or converges).

We argue that  $\gamma^t$  forms a non-decreasing sequence over time. Since any recognized player is unmatched, if the action of an unmatched player  $Z$  results in a change in the matching,  $Z$  either matches with another unmatched player, or matches to a player that was already matched. In either case, the total number of matched pairs does not decrease.

Furthermore, we prove if  $\gamma$  does not change, then  $\Phi_P$  is non-increasing. Moreover, the number of successive steps that  $\Phi_P$  stay unchanged is at most  $\gamma$ .

To see that  $\Phi_P$  is non-increasing, first note that  $\Phi_P$  can increase only when either a buyer decreases his bid or a seller increases his offer. Assume an unmatched buyer  $B$  is recognized (seller case is analogous), and the price function before his move is  $P$ . To increase  $\Phi_P$ , since  $B$  can only increase his bid, he must increase an offer by overbidding and matching with a seller  $S$ , resulting in the two of them submitting the same price  $b$ . The buyer bid increases by  $b - P(B)$  and the seller offer increases by  $b - P(S)$ . Since  $B$  is unmatched, by Lemma 1,  $P(B) \leq P(S)$ , and hence  $\Phi_P$  will not increase.

We now bound the maximum number of steps for which  $\Phi_P$  could remain unchanged. A move from a buyer  $B$  that does not change  $\Phi_P$  occurs only when  $B$  overbids a matched seller  $S$ , where the bid and the offer are equal both before and after the move. We call this a *no-change* buyer move. By analogy, a no-change seller move can be defined.

In the remainder of the proof, we first argue that a no-change buyer move can never be followed by a no-change seller move, and vice versa. After that, we prove the upper bound on the number of consecutive no-change moves to show that  $\Phi_P$  will eventually decrease (by at least  $\varepsilon$ ).

Assume at time  $t_1$ , a buyer  $B_{t_1}$  made a no-change move and matched with a seller  $S_{t_1}$ , who was originally paired with the buyer  $B'_{t_1}$ .<sup>4</sup> We prove that no seller can make a no-change move at time  $t_1 + 1$ . The case that a seller makes a no-change move first can be proved analogously. Suppose at time  $t_1 + 1$ , a seller  $S_{t_1+1}$  is recognized and decreases his offer by  $\varepsilon$ . Since  $B_{t_1}$  made a no-change move, we have

$$P^{t_1}(B'_{t_1}) = P^{t_1}(B_{t_1}) \tag{1}$$

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<sup>4</sup> An action at time  $t$  will take effect at the time  $t + 1$ , and  $P^t$  is the price function before any action is made at time  $t$ .

Denote the lowest seller offer (highest buyer bid) at any time  $t$  by  $s^t$  ( $b^t$ ). By Lemma 1,  $P^{t_1}(B_{t_1}) \leq P^{t_1}(S)$  for any seller  $S$ , hence  $P^{t_1}(B_{t_1}) \leq s^{t_1}$ . Moreover, since  $P^{t_1}(B_{t_1}) = P^{t_1}(S_{t_1}) \geq s^{t_1}$ , we have

$$P^{t_1}(B_{t_1}) = s^{t_1} \quad (2)$$

In other words, a buyer can make a no-change move, only if his bid is equal to the lowest offer. Similarly, if  $S_{t_1+1}$  can make a no-change move at time  $t_1 + 1$ , his offer is equal to the highest bid. Since the highest bid at time  $t_1$  ( $b^{t_1}$ ) is at most  $s^{t_1} + \varepsilon$  (property  $(a_1)$  of  $\varepsilon$ -stable states), after  $B_{t_1}$  submits a bid of  $s^{t_1} + \varepsilon$ , he will be submitting the highest bid at time  $t_1 + 1$ . Hence

$$P^{t_1+1}(S_{t_1+1}) = b^{t_1+1} = P^{t_1+1}(B_{t_1}) = P^{t_1+1}(B'_{t_1}) + \varepsilon \quad (3)$$

Therefore, at time  $t_1 + 1$ , after  $S_{t_1+1}$  decreases his offer by  $\varepsilon$ , the unmatched buyer  $B'_{t_1}$  is interested in  $S_{t_1+1}$ . By the unmatched first rule,  $S_{t_1+1}$  will match with an unmatched player, hence this cannot be a no-change move.

This proves that a no-change seller move can never occur after a no-change buyer move and vice versa. We now prove the upper bound on the number of consecutive no-change buyer moves.

For any sequence of consecutive no-change buyer moves, if there exists a time  $t_2$  such that  $s^{t_2} > s^{t_2-1}$ , for any unmatched buyer  $B$  at time  $t_2$ ,  $P^{t_2}(B) \leq s^{t_2-1} < s^{t_2}$ . By Equation (2), no buyer can make any more no-change move. Moreover, since any no-change buyer move will increase the submission of a matched seller who is submitting the lowest offer, after at most  $\gamma$  steps, the lowest offer must increase, implying that the length of the sequence is at most  $\gamma$ .


To conclude, the total number of steps that the market could stay in  $\gamma$ -feasible states is bounded by  $(n/\varepsilon)\gamma$ . As  $\gamma \leq n$ , the total number of steps before market converges is at most  $n^3/\varepsilon$ .  $\square$

### 3.3 General Bipartite Graphs

In this section, we study the convergence of markets with an arbitrary bipartite trading graph. Although by Theorem 3.2, using Mechanism (1), the market can reach any well-behaved  $\varepsilon$ -stable state, when the trading graph of a market can be an arbitrary bipartite graph, there is no guarantee that Mechanism (1) will actually converge.

**Claim 3.4** *In a market whose trading graph is an arbitrary bipartite graph, Mechanism (1) may never converge.*

Consider the market shown in Figure 1. In this market, there are four buyers ( $B_1$  to  $B_4$ ) all with valuation 1 and four sellers ( $S_1$  to  $S_4$ ) all with opportunity cost 0. Moreover, the trading graph is a cycle of length 8, as illustrated by the first graph in Figure 1. Assume at some time  $t$ , the market enters the state illustrated



**Fig. 1.** Unstable market with general trading graph and Mechanism (1)

by the second graph, where  $B_1, B_2, S_1, B_3, S_2$  are submitting  $5\varepsilon$ ,  $S_3, B_4, S_4$  are submitting  $6\varepsilon$ , and pairs  $(B_2, S_1)$ ,  $(B_3, S_2)$  and  $(B_4, S_4)$  are matched.

At time  $t + 1$ , since  $B_1$  is unmatched, he can be recognized and submit  $6\varepsilon$ .  $S_1$  is the only interested seller, hence  $B_1, S_1$  will match and the offer of  $S_1$  increases to  $6\varepsilon$ , which leads to the state shown in the third graph. Similarly, at time  $t + 2$ , since  $S_3$  is unmatched, he can be recognized and submit  $5\varepsilon$ .  $B_4$  is the only interested buyer, hence  $B_4, S_3$  will match and bid of  $B_4$  increases to  $6\varepsilon$ , which leads to the state shown in the fourth graph.

Notice that the states at time  $t$  and  $t + 2$  are isomorphic. By shifting the indices and repeating above two steps, the market will never converge.

Observe that the cycle described in Claim 3.4 is caused by an adversarial coordination between the actions of various agents. To break this pathological coordination, we introduce Mechanism (2) which is a natural extension of Mechanism (1) that uses randomization. We first define this mechanism, and then prove that on any trading graph, with high probability, the mechanism leads to convergence in a number of steps that is polynomially bounded in the number of agents.

**Mechanism 2** (with input parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$ )

- **Activity Rule:** Among the unmatched buyers, any buyer that neither submits a new higher bid nor has a seller that is interested in him, is labeled as inactive. All other unmatched buyers are labeled as active. An active (inactive) seller is defined analogously. An inactive player changes his status iff some player on the other side matches with him.
- **Minimum Increment:** Each submitted price must be an integer multiple of  $\varepsilon$ .
- **Bounded Increment Rule:** In each step, a player is only allowed to change his price by  $\varepsilon$ .
- **Recognition:** Among all players who are active, one is recognized uniformly at random.
- **Matching:** After a player, say a buyer  $B$ , is recognized, if  $B$  does not submit a new price, then  $B$  will match to an interested seller if one exists. If the offer of the seller is lower than the bid  $b$ , it is immediately raised to  $b$ . The seller action is defined analogously.
- **Tie Breaking:** When choosing a player on the other side to match to, an unmatched player is given priority (unmatched first rule).

Notice that we ask players to move cautiously through the bounded increment rule. Players can either change the price by  $\varepsilon$  or match with an interested seller, and always favor being active. Note that, any move in Mechanism (1) can be simulated by at most  $(1/\varepsilon + 1)$  moves in Mechanism (2) ( $1/\varepsilon$  for submitting new price and 1 for forming a match). The following is an immediate consequence of results shown in Section 3.1.

**Corollary 3.5** *For any market, if we use Mechanism (2), (i) starting from the zero-information state, any well-behaved  $\varepsilon$ -stable state can be reached in  $n(1/\varepsilon + 1)$  steps, and (ii) beginning with a valid starting state, properties  $(a_1)$  and  $(a_3)$  of  $\varepsilon$ -stable states always hold, and the final state is  $\varepsilon$ -stable.*

We establish as our second main result that for any trading graph, with high probability, Mechanism (2) converges to a  $\varepsilon$ -stable state in a number of steps polynomial in the number of agents. We prove this result using the summation of the prices submitted by *all* agents as a potential function (denoted by  $\Phi$ ). Although  $\Phi$  is clearly *not* monotone, the design of Mechanism (2) implies that  $\Phi$  acts like a *random walk on a line*. Then, using a standard fact about random walks, we are able to analyze the behavior of  $\Phi$  and argue fast convergence of the market (see the full version [1], Theorem 4.8 for a complete proof).

**Theorem 3.6.** *For any market  $G(\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{S}, E, val)$ , if we use Mechanism (2) with any input parameter  $\varepsilon > 0$ , and begin with a valid starting state, the market will converge to an  $\varepsilon$ -stable state after at most  $O((n^3/\varepsilon^2) \log n)$  steps with high probability.*

## 4 Conclusions

We resolved the second part of Friedman’s conjecture by designing a mechanism which simulates the DOA and proving that this mechanism always converges to a Walrasian equilibrium in polynomially many steps. Our mechanism captures four key properties of the DOA: agents on either side can make actions; agents only have limited information; agents can choose *any* better response (as opposed to the best response); and the submissions are recognized in an arbitrary order. An important aspect of our result is that, unlike previous models, *every* Walrasian equilibrium is reachable by some sequence of better responses.

For markets where only a restricted set of buyer-seller pairs are able to trade, we show that the DOA may never converge. However, if submissions are recognized randomly, and players only change their bids and offers by a small fixed amount, convergence is guaranteed. It is unclear that the latter condition is inherently necessary, and perhaps a convergence result can be established for a relaxed notion of bid and offer changes where players can make possibly large adjustments as long as they are consistent with the increment rule.

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