

# Flexible Regulation of Distributed Coalitions\*

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**Abstract.** This paper considers a coalition  $C$  of enterprises  $\{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$ , which is to be governed by a *coalition policy*  $P_C$ , and where each member-enterprise  $E_i$  has its own internal policy  $P_i$  that regulates its participation in the coalition. The main question addressed in this paper is how can these three policies be brought to bear, on a single transaction—given that the two internal policies  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  may be formulated independently of each other, and may be considered confidential by the respective enterprises. We provide an answer to this question via a concept of policy-hierarchy, introduced into a regulatory mechanism called Law-Governed Interaction (LGI).

## Keywords

Distributed coalition, Security policy, Decentralized regulatory mechanism, Law-Governed Interaction, Policy hierarchy, Policy interoperability.

## 1 Introduction

There is a growing tendency for organizations to form coalitions in order to collaborate—by sharing some of their resources, or by coordinating some of their activities. Such coalitions are increasingly common in various domains, such as business-to-business (B2B) commerce, under names such as “virtual enterprises” of “supply chains;” and in *grid computing* [16, 19, 18]; and among educational institutions and governmental agencies. All such coalitions need to be regulated, in order to ensure conformance with the policy that is supposed to govern the coalition as a whole, and in order to protect the interest of member organizations. This need triggered a great deal of recent access-control research for coalitions [8, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19], exhibiting several different views of the problem, and employing different techniques for its solution. Our own view of this problem, which is more general than most of the above, is based on the following definition of coalitions.

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**Definition 1.** A coalition  $C$  is a set  $\{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$  of enterprises<sup>1</sup>, which interoperate under an ensemble of policies  $[P_C, \{P_i\}]$ , where  $P_C$  is the coalition policy that governs the coalition as a whole, and  $P_i$  is the internal policy of enterprise  $E_i$ , which governs its participation in the coalition.

In Section 2 we will explain the need for a coalition to be governed by such an ensemble of policies, and illustrate the nature of such an ensemble. Here we just point out that this definition means that every interaction between an agent  $x_i$  of enterprise  $E_i$  and an agent  $x_j$  of  $E_j$  must comply with the internal policies  $P_i$  and  $P_j$ , as well as with the coalition policy  $P_C$ .

Two issues need to be addressed when establishing a regulatory framework for such a coalition: (a) the specification of the policy-ensemble that is to govern a coalition, and its evolution over time; and (b) the policy-enforcement mechanism. Regarding the latter issue, we adopt here our own access-control mechanism called Law-Governed Interaction (LGI)[13–15, 2]. We will be mostly concerned, in this paper, with the former issue above. That is, with the structure and specification of the policy-ensemble of a coalition, requiring it to satisfy the following principle of *flexibility*:

**Principle 1 (flexibility)** Each member-enterprise  $E_i$  should be able to formulate its internal policy  $P_i$ , and to change it at will, independently of the internal policies of other enterprises in the coalition, and without any knowledge of them.

Such a flexibility is important for several reasons. First, it provides each enterprise with the *autonomy* to define its own policy at will, subject only to the pre-agreed coalition policy  $P_C$ . Second, the mutual independence of the internal policies of member enterprises simplifies their formation and their evolution. Finally, this principle allows an individual enterprise to keep its own policy *confidential*, since policies of other enterprises do not depend on it.

To appreciate some of the difficulties in satisfying this principle, consider the following question: how does one ensure that an interaction between an agent  $x_i$  of enterprise  $E_i$  and an agent  $x_j$  of  $E_j$  conforms to all three policies  $P_i$ ,  $P_j$  and  $P_C$ —which govern it? A seemingly natural answer to this question is to *compose* policies  $P_i$ ,  $P_C$ , and  $P_j$  into a single policy, to be enforced by a reference monitor mediating all coalition-relevant interactions between the two enterprises  $E_i$ ,  $E_j$ . This approach has, indeed, been attempted by several researchers [9, 5, 12, 6, 20] concerned with the interoperability between agents subject to different policies. But such composition of policies has several serious drawbacks in the context of coalitions.

First, composition of policies could be computationally hard. According to [12], in particular, such composition is intractable for more than two policies, even for a relatively simple policy language. This is particularly serious problem for a coalition, which would require a quadratic number (in terms of its membership size) of compositions of triples of policies—a truly daunting prospect.

<sup>1</sup> The term “enterprise” in this definition refers to educational and governmental institutions, as well as to commercial ones.

Second, composition violates our principle of flexibility. This is because for an enterprise  $E_i$  to formulate, or change, its internal policy  $P_i$ , it will have to be aware of the internal policies of every other member-enterprise, say  $P_j$ —lest its new policy will prove to be inconsistent, and thus not composable, with  $P_j$ . (We will later review other attempts to regulate coalitions, not based on policy composition.)

*The Proposed Approach:* We adopt a *top-down* approach to the specification of the policy ensemble of a coalition. That is, we propose to start by formulating the global coalition policy  $P_C$ , which specifies its constraints over interoperability between different coalition members. We then allow individual members to formulate their own internal policies, subject to  $P_C$ , but independent of each other.

This approach is supported by a hierarchical organization of policies, recently implemented into LGI. Such a hierarchy is formed via a *superior/subordinate* relation between policies, where a *subordinate* policy is constrained, by **construction**, to conform to its *superior* policy. Under such an organization of policies, the internal policies  $P_i$  could be defined as subordinate to  $P_C$ . A pair of internal policies  $P_i$  and  $P_j$ , thus defined, are consistent with each other *by definition*, although they have been formed with no knowledge of each other, because both are guaranteed to conform to the same global policy  $P_C$ . As we shall see, the enforcement of such a hierarchical policy-ensemble can be carried out in a completely decentralized manner, without ever having to compose two independently defined policies, such as  $P_i$  and  $P_j$ , into a single policy.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 motivates the proposed approaches to the governance of coalitions, illustrating it via a fairly realistic example; this section also discusses related work. Section 3, provides an overview of the concept of law-governed interaction (LGI). Section 4 shows how policies under LGI can be organized into hierarchies, and Section 5 presents a formalization of the example policy-ensemble introduced in Section 2, via the LGI hierarchy model. We conclude in Section 6.

## 2 On the Nature of the Proposed Regulatory Framework for Coalitions

We have just proposed a regulatory framework for coalitions, under which a coalition  $C$  of enterprises  $\{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$  is to be governed by an ensemble of policies  $[P_C, \{P_i\}]$ , which satisfies the *flexibility principle*. In this section we will attempt: (1) to motivate this coalition model and to illustrate it by means of a detailed example; and (2) to compare our model with other approaches to the governance of coalitions. But we first offer some general remarks about the roles that the various policies in this ensemble are expected to play, and about what they are expected to regulate.

First, we expect the coalition policy  $P_C$  to represent prior agreement, or contract, between its member enterprises—as well as possible governmental regulation of such coalitions. For example,  $P_C$  might specify such things as the

coalition membership, and the required interaction protocol between agents of different member enterprises. It might also provide certain coalition officers with a limited ability to regulate dynamically the interaction between member enterprises. We will not be concerned in this paper with how such a policy is established. This issue has been addressed elsewhere, such as in [8], where a negotiation process between member enterprises to establish a compromised  $P_C$  has been presented.

Second, we expect the internal policy  $P_i$  of an enterprise  $E_i$  to be concerned with internal matters of this enterprise, as they are related to coalition activities. Thus,  $P_i$  might specify such things as: (a) which of its *agents* (i.e., people or system-components) are allowed to participate in the coalition activity, either as servers for fellow coalition members, or as clients for services provided by fellow members; (b) the amount of usage a given agent of this enterprise is allowed to make, of services provided by fellow member enterprises, and the amount of services a given server is allowed to provide to the coalition; and (c) the required behavior of agents of this enterprise, when serving requests from other coalition members, or when making such requests—for example,  $P_i$  may require certain coalition activities of its agents to be monitored.

## 2.1 An Example of a Policy-Ensemble

Consider a set  $\{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$  of enterprises that form a coalition  $C$  in order to collaborate by using some of each other's services—as is increasingly common in grid computing. Suppose that the coalition as a whole has a distinguished agent  $D_C$  called its *director*, and that each member enterprise  $E_i$  has its own director  $D_i$ . The function of these directors is, in part, to serve as *certification authorities* (CAs), as follows:  $D_C$  would certify the directors of the member enterprises, which, in turn, would certify the names and roles of agents within their respective enterprises. These and other roles of the directors, along with other aspects of this coalition are governed by the global coalition policy  $P_C$ , and by the internal policies of individual enterprises defined as *subordinate* to  $P_C$ , forming a two-level hierarchy depicted in Figure 1(a). These policies would now be described informally, and discussed. They would be formalized as “laws” under LGI in Section 5.

*The Coalition Policy  $P_C$* : This policy deals with two issues, as described informally below:

1. Director's control over the usage of enterprise-resources:
  - (a) *The total amount of services offered by an enterprise  $E_i$  to other coalition members is determined by director  $D_i$ , by offering to the coalition director  $D_C$  a budget  $B_i$  for using its services. This budget is expressed in terms of what we call  $E_i$ -currency, which can be created (minted, in effect) only by the director  $D_i$ , as described above.*
  - (b) *The coalition director  $D_C$  can distribute  $E_i$ -currencies he got from  $D_i$  among the directors of other member-enterprises.*

- (c)  $E_i$ -currency can be used to pay for services provided by agents of  $E_i$ . Such currency can also be moved from one agent to another within an enterprise, subject to the internal policy of that enterprise—but it cannot be forged.
2. Regulation over service requests by agents at enterprise  $E_i$  to agents in  $E_j$ :
- (a) each such request must carry the name of the sender, as authenticated by director  $D_i$ , and must be sent to an agent authenticated as a **server** by the director  $D_j$ .
- (b) Each such request must carry a payment in  $E_j$ -currency, which would be moved by this request from the client to the server. However, if the request is rejected, for whatever reason<sup>2</sup>, then the payment will be refunded to the client.

Thus, policy  $P_C$  mandates various global aspects of the coalition, including: (a) the authority, and implied responsibilities, of the various directors; (b) the requirement that service budgets minted by directors should be treated as currency, which can be *moved* from one agent to another, in particular as part of a service request, but cannot be copied or forged; and (c) the requirement that service requests must carry the proper authentication of the clients and be accepted by authenticated servers.

But policy  $P_C$  does not address many aspects of the coalition, leaving them for the internal policies of member enterprises to specify. These include, for an enterprise  $E_i$ , say, such things as: (a) how is  $E_j$ -currency, provided to  $D_i$  by the coalition director, to be distributed among the various agents of  $E_i$ ; (b) how much should servers in  $E_i$  charge for their services, and what should they do with payments received; and (c) various conditions that must be satisfied, for agents of  $E_i$  to use services of other enterprises, or to provide services to others—such as time constraints and auditing requirements. The following are two example of such internal policies, for member enterprises  $E_1$  and  $E_2$ .

*Policy  $P_1$  of enterprise  $E_1$ :*


1. The director  $D_1$  of this enterprise ( $E_1$ ) can move service currencies obtained from  $D_C$  to any other authenticated agent in its enterprise.
2. Copies of all service requests sent by agents of this enterprise, and of all requests received by its servers, must be sent to a designated audit-trail server.

*Policy  $P_2$  of enterprise  $E_2$ :*

1. Any agent in this enterprise ( $E_2$ ) can give service currencies it has, to any other agents that has been duly authenticated by the director  $D_2$ . (That is, currencies can move freely from one agents to another, unlike under  $P_1$ ,

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<sup>2</sup> The following are among the reasons for a service request to be rejected: (1) the receiver is not an authenticated server; (2) the type of currency used for payment doesn't match the server's enterprise; and (3) the request is not allowed to be served, according to the server enterprise's internal policy.



**Fig. 1.** (a) The policy ensemble governing coalition  $C$ ; (b) The distributed coalition composed of multiple enterprises and their policies.

where currencies can only be granted by the director to regular agents.) Also, every transfer of currency is to be audited by a distinguished audit-trail server.

- Agents of this enterprise are allowed to provide services to other coalition members, or to request such services, only after normal working hours (namely, from 6:00PM to 8:00AM).

Note that it is an essential aspect of the policy-ensemble of this coalition that it is hierarchical, as depicted in Figure 1(a). As we shall see in Section 4, this means that all internal policies  $P_i$  conform to  $P_C$ , so that none of them would be able to violate any of the provisions of  $P_C$ . For example, it would not be possible to write a internal policy for an enterprise  $E_j$ , say, that allows agents of  $E_j$  to forge  $E_j$ -currency. This provides an assurance for the director  $D_i$  of enterprise  $E_i$  that the total amount of  $E_i$ -currency circulating among the agents of the various coalition members—and, thus, the total amount of services its agents may be asked to perform—does not exceed the service budget  $B_i$  he originally sent to the coalition director  $D_C$ .

Therefore, the various member enterprises have the flexibility of being able to write their policies independently of the policies of other members, and they can change their policies at will. And yet, each enterprise can be confident that its interlocutors conform to the same common coalition-policy  $P_C$ .

Figure 1(b) provides an overview of the governance of coalition  $C$  by its hierarchical policy-ensemble. The outer box in this figure represents policy  $P_C$ , which governs the internal policies  $P_i$ —represented by boxes nested in it—as well as the coalition director, which operates directly under  $P_C$ . The directors of member-enterprises, represented by shaded shapes, along with other agents of such enterprises, are governed directly by their own policies, but indirectly by  $P_C$ . This figure attempts to illustrate two notable aspects of these policies: (1) the coalition director  $D_C$  is only involved in the distribution of service currency among the directors of member enterprises. He (she, or it) is not involved in the actual sharing of services (represented by the thick arrows) which is done directly

between the agents of different member enterprises. (2) the internal policy  $P_i$  does not, necessarily, govern the entire enterprise  $E_i$ , but only the involvement of  $E_i$  in the working of coalition  $C$ .

## 2.2 Other Approaches to the Governance of Coalitions

Our view that coalitions need to be governed by an ensemble of policies  $[P_C, \{P_i\}]$  is not the common view of the governance of coalitions—not to speak of our hierarchical structure of such an ensemble, which is quite unique. In this section we review several other approaches to this issue—starting with projects that employ only internal policies, and ending with those that employ both internal and global policies, but in different manners from ours. All the projects to be reviewed below also differ from ours in their enforcement mechanisms, and in their expressive power—which is generally based on stateless RBAC models, and are much weaker than ours. We will comment about these issues, wherever appropriate.

(I) Shands et al. [18], employ only internal  $P_i$  policies, with no global coalition policy. Moreover, the only control that these policies may have over the ability of agents to issue service requests, is by assigning them to roles. The server enforces its own policy, as well as that of its client, for each service request. In the approach of Thomson et al. [19], enterprises define their policies regarding a resource in which they have a stake, by issuing digitally-signed certificates. Only when all the stakeholders' access requirements are met can the access be performed. Similarly to [18], all policies are enforced by the server asked to perform a service.

There are several problems with this kind of *server-centric* policy enforcement approach in the coalition context: First, the client enterprise needs to trust the distributed heterogeneous servers to implement and enforce correctly not only their internal enterprise policy, but also that of the client enterprise. Furthermore, the server needs to know the internal policy of the client enterprise, which violates the *confidentiality* requirement of our principle of flexibility. Finally, it is virtually impossible for a server to enforce a *stateful* client's policy, such as our policies regarding the movement of currency on the client side.

(II) Several projects take a bottom-up approach. They start with the internal  $P_i$  policies, but attempt, in various ways, to form a global coalition policy from them. These include the already mentioned work of McDaniel et al. [12], which attempted to compose the internal policies automatically into a single common policy, finding this task to be computationally hard. Another approach to this problem is that of Gligor et al. [8], which tries to establish the common access policy via negotiation among the coalition members.

(III) Finally, we are aware of two projects that, like us, view a coalition as being governed by a global coalition policy as well as by the internal policies of individual coalition members. One of these is the project of Pearlman et al. [16], where servers are expected to take into account certificates issued by a centralized enforcer, driven by the coalition policy. The other such project, which is philosophically closest to our own, is that of Belokosztolszki and Moody [4].

They introduce the concept of *meta policy*, which is expected to be conformed to by all internal policies of member enterprises, and is, thus, analogous to our coalition policy  $P_C$ . However, this work is based on the RBAC model for access control, which is much weaker than LGI. In particular, a statful policy, which is sensitive to “service currency,” such as our example policy, cannot be represented via RBAC. It is not clear to us how their construction could be extended to such policies.

### 3 Law-Governed Interaction (LGI)—an Overview

LGI is a message-exchange mechanism that allows an *open group* of distributed agents to engage in a mode of interaction *governed* by an explicitly specified policy, called the *law* of the group. The messages thus exchanged under a given law  $\mathcal{L}$  are called  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages, and the group of agents interacting via  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages is called a *community*  $\mathcal{C}$ , or, more specifically, an  $\mathcal{L}$ -community  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$ . This mechanism has been originally proposed by one of the authors (Minsky) in 1991 [13], and then implemented, as described in [15, 1].

By the phrase “open group” we mean (a) that the membership of this group (or, community) can change dynamically, and can be very large; and (b) that the members of a given community can be heterogeneous. All the members are treated as black boxes by LGI, which deals only with the interaction between them via  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages, ensuring conformance to the law of the community.

We now give a brief discussion of the concept of law, emphasizing its local nature, a description of the decentralized LGI mechanism for law enforcement, and its treatment of digital certificates. We do not discuss here several important aspects of LGI, including its concepts of *obligations* and of *exceptions*, the expressive power of LGI, and its efficiency. For these issues, and for implementation details, the reader is referred to [15, 1].

#### 3.1 On the Nature of LGI Laws, and their Decentralized Enforcement

The function of an LGI law  $\mathcal{L}$  is to regulate the exchange of  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages between members of a community  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$ . Such regulation may involve (a) restriction of the kind of messages that can be exchanged between various members of  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$ , which is the traditional function of access-control policies; (b) transformation of certain messages, possibly rerouting them to different destinations; and (c) causing certain messages to be emitted spontaneously, under specified circumstances, for monitoring purposes, say.

A crucial feature of LGI is that its laws can be *stateful*. That is, a law  $\mathcal{L}$  can be sensitive to the dynamically changing *state* of the interaction among members of  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$ . Where by “state” we mean some function of the history of this interaction, called the *control-state* (CS) of the community. The dependency of this control-state on the history of interaction is defined by the law  $\mathcal{L}$  itself. For example, under law  $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{C}}$  to be introduced in section 5, as a formalization of our

example  $P_C$  policy, the term  $\text{budget}(B_i, E_i)$  in the control-state of an agent denotes the amount of budget this agent gets from its director or other agents.

But the most salient and unconventional aspects of LGI laws are their strictly local formulation, and the decentralized nature of their enforcement. To motivate these aspects of LGI we start with an outline of a centralized treatment of interaction-laws in distributed systems. Finding this treatment unscalable, we will show how it can be decentralized.


*On a centralized enforcement of interaction laws:* Suppose that the exchange of  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages between the members of a given community  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$  is mediated by a reference monitor  $\mathcal{T}$ , which is trusted by all of them. Let  $\mathcal{T}$  consist of the following three part: (a) the law  $\mathcal{L}$  of this community, written in a given language for writing laws; (b) a generic *law enforcer*  $\mathcal{E}$ , built to interpret any well formed law written in the given law-language, and to carry out its rulings; and (c) the control-state ( $\mathcal{CS}$ ) of community  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$  (see Figure 2(a)).

The structure of the control-state, and its effect on the exchange of messages between members of  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$  are both determined by law  $\mathcal{L}$ . For example, under law  $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{C}}$ , a message  $\text{giveCurrency}(\dots)$  will cause the specific service currency to be reduced from the CS of the sender and added to that of the receiver.

This straightforward mechanism provides for very expressive laws. The central reference monitor  $\mathcal{T}$  has access to the entire history of interaction within the community in question. And a law can be written to maintain any function of this history as the control-state of the community, which may have any desired effect on the interaction between community members. Unfortunately, this mechanism is inherently unscalable, as it can become a bottleneck, when serving a large community, and a dangerous single point of failure.

Moreover, when dealing with stateful policies, these drawbacks of centralization cannot be easily alleviated by replicating the reference monitor  $\mathcal{T}$ , as it is done in the Tivoli system [10], for example. The problem, in a nutshell, is that if there are several replicas of  $\mathcal{T}$ , then any change in  $\mathcal{CS}$ , like the reduction of the service currency from a sender  $x$  of message  $\text{giveCurrency}(\dots)$ , in the example above, would have to be carried out *synchronously* at all the replicas; otherwise  $x$  may be able to send more service currency to other agents than what it actually has, via different replicas. Such maintenance of consistency between replicas is very time consuming, and is quite unscalable with respect to the number of replicas of  $\mathcal{T}$ .

Fortunately, as we shall see below, law enforcement can be genuinely *decentralized*, and carried out by a distributed set  $\{\mathcal{T}_x \mid x \in \mathcal{C}\}$  of, what we call, *controllers*, one for each members of community  $\mathcal{C}$  (see Figure 2(b)). Unlike the central reference monitor  $\mathcal{T}$  above, which carries the CS of the entire community, controller  $\mathcal{T}_x$  carries only the *local control-state*  $\mathcal{CS}_x$  of  $x$ —where  $\mathcal{CS}_x$  is some function, defined by law  $\mathcal{L}$ , of the history of communication between  $x$  and the rest of the  $\mathcal{L}$ -community. In other words, changes of  $\mathcal{CS}_x$  are strictly local, not having to be correlated with the control-states of other members of the  $\mathcal{L}$ -community.



**Fig. 2.** Law Enforcement: (a) centralized version; (b) decentralized law enforcement under LGI

*The local nature of LGI laws:* An LGI law is defined over a certain types of events occurring at members of a community  $\mathcal{C}$  subject to it, mandating the effect that any such event should have. Such a mandate is called the *ruling* of the law for the given event. The events subject to laws, called *regulated events*, include (among others): the *sending* and the *arrival* of an  $\mathcal{L}$ -message; and the *submission of a digital certificate*. The operations that can be included in the ruling for a given regulated event, called *primitive operations*, are all local with respect to the agent in which the event occurred (called, the “home agent”). They include, operations on the control-state of the home agent and operations on messages, such as **forward** and **deliver**. To summarize, an LGI law must satisfy the following locality properties:

- (a) a law can regulate explicitly only *local events* at individual agents; (b) the ruling for an event  $e$  at agent  $x$  can depend only on  $e$  itself, and on the *local control-state*  $\mathcal{CS}_x$ ; and (c) the ruling for an event that occurs at  $x$  can mandate only *local operations* to be carried out at  $x$ .

*Decentralization of law-enforcement:* As has been pointed out, we replace the central reference monitor  $\mathcal{T}$  with a distributed set  $\{\mathcal{T}_x \mid x \in \mathcal{C}\}$  of controllers, one for each members of community  $\mathcal{C}$ . Structurally, all these controllers are generic, with the same law-enforcer  $\mathcal{E}$ , and all must be trusted to interpret correctly any law they might operate under. When serving members of community  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{L}}$ , however, they all carry the *same law*  $\mathcal{L}$ . And each controller  $\mathcal{T}_x$  associated with an agent  $x$  of this community carries only the *local control-state*  $\mathcal{CS}_x$  of  $x$  (see Figure 2(b)).

Due to the local nature of LGI laws, each controller  $\mathcal{T}_x$  can handle events that occur at its client  $x$  strictly locally, with no explicit dependency on anything that might be happening with other members in the community. It should also be pointed out that controller  $\mathcal{T}_x$  handles the events at  $x$  strictly sequentially, in the order of their occurrence, and atomically. This, and the locality of laws, greatly simplifies the structure of the controllers, making them easier to use as our *trusted computing base* (TCB).

Finally, we point out that the LGI model is silent on the placement of controllers *vis-a-vis* the agents they serve, and it allows for the sharing of a single controller by several agents. This provides us with welcome flexibilities, which can be used to minimize the overhead of LGI under various conditions.

*On the structure and formulation of laws:* Broadly speaking, the law of a community is a function that returns a *ruling* for any possible regulated event that might occur at any one of its members. The ruling returned by the law is a possibly empty sequence of primitive operations, which is to be carried out locally at the location of the event from which the ruling was derived (called the *home* of the event). (By default, an empty ruling implies that the event in question has no consequences—such an event is effectively ignored.)

More formally, an LGI law  $\mathcal{L}$  is a function (called the *ruling* function) of the following form:

$$r = L(e, cs), e \in E, cs \in CS, r \in R \quad (1)$$

where  $E$  is the set of regulated events,  $CS$  is the set of control states, and  $R$  is the set of all possible sequences of operations that constitute the ruling of the law.

Concretely, such a function can be expressed in many languages. Our middleware currently provides two languages for writing laws: Java, and a somewhat restricted version of Prolog [7]. We employ prolog in this paper. In this case, the law is defined by means of a Prolog-like program  $L$  which, when presented with a goal  $e$ , representing a regulated-event at a given agent  $x$ , is evaluated in the context of the control-state of this agent  $cs$ , producing the list of primitive-operations  $r$  representing the ruling of the law for this event. In addition to the standard types of Prolog goals, the body of a rule may contain two distinguished types of goals that have special roles to play in the interpretation of the law. These are the *sensor-goals* (in the form  $t@CS$ ), which allow the law to “sense” the control-state of the home agent, and the *do-goals* (in the form  $do(p)$ ) that contribute to the ruling of the law.

*On the basis for trust between members of a community:* For a member of an  $\mathcal{L}$ -community to trust its interlocutors to observe the same law, one needs the following assurances: (a) that the exchange of  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages is mediated by correctly implemented controllers; (b) that these controllers are interpreting the *same law*  $\mathcal{L}$ ; and (c) that  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages are securely transmitted over the network. If these conditions are satisfied, then it follows that if  $x$  receives an  $\mathcal{L}$ -message from some  $y$ , this message must have been sent as an  $\mathcal{L}$ -message; in other words, that  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages cannot be forged.

Broadly speaking, these assurances are provided as follows: Controllers used for mediating the exchange of  $\mathcal{L}$ -messages authenticate themselves to each other via certificates signed by a certification authority specified by the value of the  $ca$  attribute in the `law` clause of law  $\mathcal{L}$  (see, for example, Figure 4, in the case of law  $P_C$ ). Note that different laws may, thus, require different certification levels

for the controllers used for its enforcement. Messages sent across the network are digitally signed by the sending controller, and the signature is verified by the receiving controller. To ensure that a message forwarded by a controller  $\mathcal{T}_x$  under law  $\mathcal{L}$  would be handled by another controller  $\mathcal{T}_y$  operating under the *same* law,  $\mathcal{T}_x$  appends a one-way hash [17]  $H$  of law  $\mathcal{L}$  to the message it forwards to  $\mathcal{T}_y$ .  $\mathcal{T}_y$  would accept this as a valid  $\mathcal{L}$ -message under  $\mathcal{L}$  if and only if  $H$  is identical to the hash of its own law.

*The deployment of LGI* All one needs for the deployment of LGI is the availability of a set of trustworthy controllers, and a way for a prospective client to locate an available controller. This can be accomplished via one or more *controller-services*, each of which maintains a set of controllers, and one or more certification authorities that certifies the correctness of controllers. For an agent  $x$  to engage in LGI communication under a law  $\mathcal{L}$ , it needs to locate a controller, via a controller-service, and supply this controller with the law  $\mathcal{L}$  it wants to employ. Once  $x$  is operating under law  $\mathcal{L}$  it may need to distinguish itself as playing a certain role, or having a certain unique name, which would provide it with some distinct privileges under law  $\mathcal{L}$ . One can do this by presenting certain digital certificates to the controller. For the details of how to deal with the certificate, including its expiration and revocation in LGI, the reader is referred to [2].

## 4 The LGI Law-Hierarchy

We will introduce here the concept of law-hierarchy that formalizes the policy-hierarchy described in Section 2. Each such hierarchy, or tree, of laws  $t(\mathcal{L}_0)$ , is rooted in some law  $\mathcal{L}_0$ . And each law in  $t(\mathcal{L}_0)$  is said to be (transitively) *subordinate* to its parent, and (transitively) *superior* to its descendents. (As a concrete example of such a hierarchy we will use the two-level tree  $t(\mathcal{P}_C)$  which is the formalization under LGI of the policy hierarchy depicted in Figure 1(a).)

Generally speaking, each law  $\mathcal{L}'$  in a hierarchy  $t(\mathcal{L}_0)$  is created by *refining* a law  $\mathcal{L}$ , the parent of  $\mathcal{L}'$ , via a *delta*  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$ , where a delta is a collection of rules defined as a refinement of an existing law (we will, generally denote a delta via an overline above the name of the law they create). The root  $\mathcal{L}_0$  of a hierarchy is a normal LGI law, except that it is created to be *open* for refinements, in a sense to be explained below. This process of refinement is defined in a manner that guarantees that every law in a hierarchy *conforms* to its superior law—as we shall see later.

For example, in coalition  $C$ , the local law  $\mathcal{P}_1$  of enterprise  $E_1$  would be created by refining the coalition law  $\mathcal{P}_C$  by means of delta  $\overline{\mathcal{P}_1}$ , defined in Figure 5. This is how the hierarchy  $t(\mathcal{P}_C)$ —the ensemble of policies governing coalition  $C$ —is formed.

We will introduce here an abstract—language-independent—model for law-refinement. This is followed by a description of a concrete realization of this model, for laws written in Prolog. Finally, we will discuss the basis for trust between members of different communities under our law-hierarchy model.

#### 4.1 An Abstract Model

Recall that an LGI law  $\mathcal{L}$  as described in Section 3 is essentially a *ruling* function defined in Equation 1, and illustrated in Figure 3(a). We will now *open up* this law, by: (a) allowing it to consult a collection of rules designed to refine it—called a *delta*; and (b) by taking the advice returned by this delta into account, when computing its ruling. This is done by replacing the  $L$  function defined in Equation 1 with a pair of functions: a *consultation function*  $L_C$ , defined in Equation 2, which computes a *pseudo event*  $pe$  to be presented to the refining delta for evaluation; and a *ruling function*  $L_R$ , defined in Equation 3, which takes the *proposed ruling*  $pr$  returned by the refining delta, and computes the final ruling of the law. The open law is illustrated in Figure 3(b), and this law with a specific delta is depicted in Figure 3(c).

$$pe = L_C(e, cs) \quad (2)$$

$$r = L_R(e, cs, pr) \quad (3)$$

These two functions are evaluated in succession, as follows: when an event  $e$  is submitted to law  $\mathcal{L}$  for evaluation, the function  $L_C$  is evaluated first, producing a pseudo event  $pe$ , which is passed to delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$  for *consultation*. The delta operates just like the standard LGI law, producing its ruling—called, in this context, a “proposed ruling”  $pr$ —which is then fed as an input to the ruling function  $L_R$ . The result  $r$  produced by  $L_R$  is, finally the ruling of law  $\mathcal{L}$ .

Suppose now that unlike the open law  $\mathcal{L}$ , its delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$  is closed; that is, it is a single function, defined by Equation 4, which computes its proposed ruling  $pr$  without consulting anything.

$$pr = \overline{\mathcal{L}'}(pe, cs), pe \in E, cs \in CS, pr \in R \quad (4)$$

Then the refinement of law  $\mathcal{L}$  via delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$ , produces a regular LGI law  $\mathcal{L}'$ —which is not open to further refinements—as illustrated by Figure 3(c).


Now, note that the ruling function of this *closed* law  $\mathcal{L}'$  is a composition of functions 2, 3 and 4 above, which has the following form:

$$r = L'(e, cs) = L_R(e, cs, \overline{\mathcal{L}'}(L_C(e, cs), cs)) \quad (5)$$

Law  $\mathcal{L}'$  defined by this ruling function is called a *subordinate* to law  $\mathcal{L}$ .

It should be pointed out that we limited ourselves here to closed deltas, which do not consult anything when computing their rulings. Such deltas can produce hierarchies of depth two, at most—which is all we need in this paper. However, this model can be extended to open deltas that consult other deltas at a lower level, thus producing a cascade of refinements, and a hierarchy of arbitrary depth. Such a model is outlined in [3], but is beyond the scope of this paper.

Finally, we can now explain the sense in which a law  $\mathcal{L}'$ , which is subordinate to  $\mathcal{L}$  in a hierarchy, is said to *conform* to its superior law  $\mathcal{L}$ : Law  $\mathcal{L}'$  is created by refining  $\mathcal{L}$  via a delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$ . As is evident from both Figure 3 and Equation 5,



**Fig. 3.** (a) An closed LGI law  $\mathcal{L}$ , in context; (b) An open-up law  $\mathcal{L}$ ; (c) Refinement of law  $\mathcal{L}$  via delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$ , producing law  $\mathcal{L}'$

this is done by having the ruling of the delta submitted as an input to the ruling function of  $\mathcal{L}$ , which finally produces the ruling. Thus, the final decision about the ruling of law  $\mathcal{L}'$  is made by its superior law  $\mathcal{L}$ , leaving to its deltas only an advisory role.

#### 4.2 A Concrete Realization of Law Hierarchy, for Laws Written in Prolog

We now describe how our current Prolog-based language for writing laws has been extended to implement the abstract model of law hierarchies. We start with the manner that a law can consult its deltas, then we describe the structure of the deltas themselves, and we conclude with the way that a law can decide on the disposition of ruling proposals returned to it by its deltas.

*Consulting deltas:* Suppose that we are operating under law  $\mathcal{L}'$ , which is a refinement of law  $\mathcal{L}$  via delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$ . An arbitrary consultation function  $L_C$  (see Equation 2) can be defined into a law  $\mathcal{L}$ , by inserting a clause of the form `delegate(g)`, anywhere in the body of any rule of  $\mathcal{L}$ , where  $g$  is an arbitrary Prolog term. The presence of a `delegate(g)` clause serves to invite refining deltas to propose operations to be added to the ruling being computed.

To see the effect of the `delegate(g)` clause, more specifically, suppose that law  $\mathcal{L}$  contains the following rule  $r$ :

$$h \text{ :- } \dots, \text{delegate}(g), \dots$$

If the evaluation of  $\mathcal{L}$  gets to the `delegate(g)` clause of rule  $r$ , then goal  $g$  is submitted to the delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$  for evaluation, playing the role of the pseudo event  $pe$  in Equation 2. This evaluation by the delta will produce a list of operations  $pr$ , which would be fed back to  $\mathcal{L}$ , as the ruling proposal of the delta, for goal  $g$ . The operations thus proposed are provisionally added to the ruling, but their final disposition will be determined by  $\mathcal{L}$ , as we shall see later.

Finally, note that `delegate(g)` clause in a law  $\mathcal{L}$  has no effect when  $\mathcal{L}$  has no delta.

*The structure of law deltas:* A refining delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$  of a law  $\mathcal{L}$  looks pretty much like the root-law  $\mathcal{L}_0$  of the law-tree, with two distinctions:

First, the top clause in the delta is

```
law(name(L'),ca(pk)) refines L,
```

where  $L$  is the name of the law being refined,  $L'$  is the name of this delta, and  $pk$  is the public key of the certifying authority to certify the controllers enforcing law  $L'$ .

Second, the heads of the rules in  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$  need to match the goals delegated to it by law  $\mathcal{L}$ , and not the original regulated events that must be matched by the rules of the root-law  $\mathcal{L}_0$ . Although the goals delegated to a refining delta can, and often do, take the form of regulated events, like `sent(...)`, and `arrived(...)`, as is the case in our case study in Section 5.

Finally, note that each delta has read access to the entire control-state (CS) of the agent. That is, the rules that constitute a given delta can contain arbitrary conditions involving all the terms of the CS.

*The disposition of ruling proposals:* A law  $\mathcal{L}$  can specify the disposition of operation in the ruling proposal returned to it by any refining delta  $\overline{\mathcal{L}'}$ . This is done via *rewrite rules* of the form:

```
rewrite(0) :- C,replace(0list)
```

where  $0$  is some term,  $C$  is some condition, and  $0list$  is a possibly empty list of operations. The effect of these rules are as follows. First let  $rp$  be the set of terms proposed by a refining delta in response to the execution of a delegate clause in  $\mathcal{L}$ . For each term  $p$  in  $rp$ , a goal `rewrite(p)` is submitted for evaluation by law  $\mathcal{L}$ . If this evaluation fails, which happens, in particular, if none of the `rewrite(0)` rules in  $\mathcal{L}$  matches this goal, then term  $p$  is added to the ruling of law  $\mathcal{L}$ .

If, on the other hand, the evaluation succeeds by matching one of the `rewrite` rules and condition  $C$  of this rule evaluates to true, then  $p$  is replaced by the list  $0list$ .  $0list$  is then added to the ruling of  $\mathcal{L}$ . Note that if  $0list$  is empty, then term  $p$  would be discarded in spite of its inclusion in the ruling proposal made by the refining delta. For example, the *rewrite rule* of law  $\mathcal{P}_C$  in Figure 4, which is the implementation of our example coalition policy, will discard any proposed **forward** operations of **service currency** movement from its refining delta to make sure no service currency can be forged. Further,  $C$  cannot contain a **delegate** clause so that no further consultation is possible with the refining delta on the disposition of  $p$ ; we believe that this constraint keeps the model easy to understand without real loss of flexibility.

So, the `rewrite` rules of a law  $\mathcal{L}$  determine what is to be done with each operation proposed by a refining delta: whether it should be blocked, included in the ruling, or replaced by some list of operations. Note that each `rewrite` rule is applied to the ruling proposal returned by a refining delta, regardless of which **delegate** clause originally led to the consultation with the refining delta.

Finally, LGI features another technique to regulate the effect of a refining delta on the eventual ruling of the law. It can protect certain terms in the control-state from modification by refining deltas of a given law  $\mathcal{L}$ . This is done by including the clause

```
protected(T)
```

in the **Preamble** clause of law  $\mathcal{L}$  (see Figure 4 for example), where  $T$  is a list of terms. For example, if the following statement appears in  $\mathcal{L}$ ,

```
protected([name(_),role(_)])
```

then no refinement of  $\mathcal{L}$  can propose an operation that modifies the terms **name** and/or **role**. Strictly speaking, such protection of terms in the control state can be carried out via **rewrite** rules, but the **protected** clauses are much more convenient for this purpose.

#### 4.3 On The Basis for Trust Between Members of Different Communities

Recall that a law may require that all the controllers used to interpret it are certified by a specific CA. And different, independent, laws may require different CAs for this purpose (see Section 3.1). The situation with laws related via the *subordinate* relation is as follows: Consider a law  $\mathcal{L}$  that requires certification by  $ca$ , and suppose that law  $\mathcal{L}'$ , which is subordinate to  $\mathcal{L}$ , requires certification by  $ca'$ . In this case we require the controllers interpreting law  $\mathcal{L}'$  to be certified by both CAs:  $ca$  and  $ca'$ .

Now, consider agents  $x$  and  $y$  operating under laws  $\mathcal{L}_x$  and  $\mathcal{L}_y$ , respectively. And suppose that these laws permit these agents to exchange messages, provided that both laws above are *subordinate* to a common law, say  $\mathcal{L}$ . When these two agents communicate, it would be necessary to ensure that: (a) the exchange is mediated by properly certified controllers; and (b) that these controllers are interpreting laws that have a common superior.

The first assurance above is obtained by having the controller of  $x$  (and similarly for that of  $y$ ) authenticated by the CA required by the common superior law  $\mathcal{L}$ , as well as by the CA required by law  $\mathcal{L}_x$ , if any. The second assurance is obtained by checking the *subordinate* relationship of the laws (all the laws are identified by their one-way hashes). In our law-language this kind of check is carried out by the predicate

```
conforms(L',L),
```

which is true if and only if law  $\mathcal{L}'$  is identical, or subordinate, to law  $\mathcal{L}$ . (See Figure 4 for an example of the use of this predicate.)

## 5 A Case Study

We now show how the policy hierarchy described in Section 2 can be specified in LGI, using the mechanisms just introduced. We start by formalizing the coalition policy  $P_C$ , making it into an LGI law  $\mathcal{P}_C$ . We then formalize policies  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  via deltas that refine law  $\mathcal{P}_C$ .

### 5.1 Establishing the Coalition Policy $P_C$

Law  $\mathcal{P}_C$ , which implements policy  $P_C$ , is shown in Figures 4. This, like any other LGI laws, has two parts: (a) a **Preamble**, which specifies such things as certifying authorities acceptable to this law, and the initial control state of agents operating under it; and (b) the set of rules, whose formal statement is followed by informal comments, in italics.

$\mathcal{P}_C$ 's **Preamble** has several clauses. The **law** clause indicate that this is a root-law, specifying its name, and the public key of the CA that is to be used for certifying the controllers interpreting this law. The **authority** clause specifies the public key of a CA—the **coalition director**  $D_C$ , whose certification would be accepted by this law for the authentication of the **member enterprise directors**  $D_i$ —as we shall see. The **initialCS** clause specifies that the initial control state of everybody who adopt this law would be empty. Finally, the **protected** clause specifies four control-state terms that would be protected from change by refining deltas. They are: **myDirector**(-, -), **budget**(-, -), **name**(-), and **role**(-), which we will discuss later.

Our discussion of the rules of this law is organized as follows: We start with how directors of enterprises, and agents working for them, are authenticated; and how an agent can claim his official names and the role he is to play within its enterprise. Second, we show how service budgets are allocated by enterprise directors, how they are distributed by the coalition director, and service currency is to be moved from one agent to another. Third, we discuss how service request are sent, and what happens if a request is rejected. Finally, we show how the coalition law  $\mathcal{P}_C$  limits the power of the deltas that might be used to refine it.

*(a) Coalition membership, and agent authentication:* For the director  $D$  of enterprise  $E$  to claim his role under this law, he needs to present a certificate issued by the coalition director  $D_C$ , with the attribute **role**(**directorOf**( $E$ )). By Rule  $\mathcal{R}1$ , this would cause the term **directorOf**( $E$ ) to be added to his control-state.

For any other agent  $x$  of the enterprise  $E$  to join the coalition, it needs to present two certificates: One, issued by coalition director  $D_C$  to certify its director  $D$ , and getting its public key ; this is done via Rule  $\mathcal{R}1$ , which will add the term **myDirector**( $D, E$ ) to the CS of  $x$ . The other, issued by its director  $D$  to certify the name and role of  $x$ ; this is done via Rule  $\mathcal{R}2$ , which will add the attribute **name**( $N$ ) and possible **role**( $R$ ), to the CS of  $x$ .

Note that the terms added to the CS of various agents as the result of such certification serve as a kind of *seals* that authenticate the role of these agents for their interaction with other agents in the coalition.

<p><i>P</i>reamble:</p> <p>law(name(<math>\mathcal{P}_C</math>),ca(publicKey1)).  authority(<math>D_C</math>,publicKey2).  initialCS([]).  <b>protected</b>([myDirector(−,−),budget(−,−),name(−),role(−)]).</p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}1</math>. certified([issuer(<math>D_C</math>),subject(D),attributes([role(directorOf(E))])])  :- if (D=Self) then do(+role(directorOf(E))) else do(+myDirector(D,E)).  <i>The director D of enterprise E needs to be certified by a certificate issued by the coalition director <math>D_C</math>.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}2</math>. certified([issuer(D),subject(Self),attributes(A)]) :- myDirector(D,E)@CS,name(N)@A,  do(+name(N)), if role(server)@A then do(+role(server)).  <i>Claiming the name and role within one coalition member enterprise E via certificate issued by the director D of that enterprise.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}3</math>. sent(D,grantBudget(B,E),[<math>D_C</math>,ThisLaw]) :- role(directorOf(E))@CS, do(forward).  <i>Only the director of the member enterprise E can contribute the initial budget (B,E) to the coalition director <math>D_C</math>.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}4</math>. arrived([D,Ld],grantBudget(B,E),<math>D_C</math>) :- conforms(Ld,ThisLaw),  if (budget(B1,E)@CS) then do(budget(B1,E)&lt;-budget(B1+B,E)) else  do(+budget(B,E)), do(deliver).  <i>The contributed budget B from enterprise E will be recorded as term budget(B,E) in the control state of the coalition director.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}5</math>. sent(<math>D_C</math>,grantBudget(B,E),[D,Ld]) :- conforms(Ld,ThisLaw),  budget(B1,E)@CS, B1 &gt;= B, do(budget(B1,E)&lt;-budget(B1-B,E)), do(forward).  <i>The initial budget assignment from the coalition director to the member enterprise directors.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}6</math>. arrived([<math>D_C</math>,ThisLaw],grantBudget(B,E),D) :- role(directorOf(Ei))@CS,  if (budget(B1,E)@CS) then do(budget(B1,E)&lt;-budget(B1+B,E)) else  do(+budget(B,E)), do(deliver).  <i>Only the member enterprise's director can receive the initial budget from the coalition director.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}7</math>. sent(X,giveCurrency(B,E),[Y,Ly])  :- conforms(Ly,ThisLaw), budget(B1,E)@CS, B1&gt;=B, <b>delegate(ThisGoal)</b>, if  (<b>permits@Ruling</b>) then do(budget(B1,E)&lt;-budget(B1-B,E)), do(forward).  <i>An agent can give part of its service currency to others if it is authorized by the local law delta of its enterprise.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}8</math>. arrived([X,Lx],giveCurrency(B,E),Y) :- conforms(Lx,ThisLaw),  if (budget(B1,E)@CS) then do(budget(B1,E)&lt;-budget(B1+B,E)) else  do(+budget(B,E)), do(deliver).  <i>The service currency given by other agents will be added into the receiver's account.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}9</math>. sent(X,sr(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E)),[Y,Ly]) :- conforms(Ly,ThisLaw),  name(N)@CS, budget(B,E)@CS,B &gt;= P, <b>delegate(ThisGoal)</b>,  if (<b>permits@Ruling</b>) do(budget(B,E)&lt;-budget(B-P,E)), do(forward).  <i>Any service request must contain the name of the sender and the payment, and be authorized by the local law delta of the sender enterprise.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}10</math>. arrived([X,Lx],sr(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E)),Y) :- conforms(Lx,ThisLaw),  if (myDirector(D,E)@CS, role(server)@CS, <b>delegate(ThisGoal)</b>,  <b>permitA@Ruling</b>) then  (budget(B,E)@CS, do(budget(B,E)&lt;-budget(B+P,E)), do(deliver))  else (name(M)@CS,  do(forward(Self,srReject(from(M),service(S),payment(P,E)),[X,Lx]))).  <i>Only a certified server can process the service request if it is authorized by its local enterprise law delta. Otherwise, the request will be rejected.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}11</math>. arrived([X,Lx],srReject(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E)),Y) :-  conforms(Lx,ThisLaw), budget(B,E)@CS, do(budget(B,E)&lt;-budget(B+P,E)),  do(deliver).  <i>The arrival of the service reject message will restore the client's budget by that payment.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}12</math>. <b>rewrite</b>(forward(X,M,[Y,Ly])) :- conforms(Ly,ThisLaw),  if (M=(grantBudget(−,−)   giveCurrency(−,−) sr(−,−,−)   srReject(−,−,−))) then replace([]).  <i>Make sure that no subordinate law delta can violate the properties of this law.</i></p>
---

Fig. 4. Law  $\mathcal{P}_C$

(b) *Allocation of budgets, and moving currencies:* By Rule  $\mathcal{R}3$ , a director  $D$  of enterprise  $E$  can send a message `grantBudget(B,E)` to the coalition director  $D_C$ , which (by Rule  $\mathcal{R}4$ ) will add the term `budget(B,E)` to the CS of  $D_C$ , upon its arrival. This budget for services by enterprise  $E$  can be redistributed (by Rules  $\mathcal{R}5$  and  $\mathcal{R}6$ ) among the directors of other enterprises.

Note that the term `budget(B,E)` in the CS of any agent represents under this law what we have called  $E$ -currency, i.e., currency that can be used for paying servers in enterprise  $E$ . The law allows such currencies to be *moved* from one agent to another, subject to the various policies, but it provides no means for forging currencies.  $E$ -currency can be moved by any agent to another via the `giveCurrency(B,E)` message, regulated by Rules  $\mathcal{R}7$  and Rule  $\mathcal{R}8$ , provided that such transfer is permitted by the enterprise refining delta.

It is instructive to observe how Rule  $\mathcal{R}7$  checks for the permission of currency transfer by a refining delta. After the `delegate(ThisGoal)` clause (`ThisGoal` would be bound to the head of the evaluated rule, in this case, the currency `sent` event), a check is performed to see whether an operation `permitS` is in the ruling compiled thus far (`Ruling`); if `permitS` is present, then the currency transfer is performed.

Finally, we note that both the redistribution of the service currency by the enterprise's director, and the subsequent movement of it among the regular agents, are governed by the same Rule  $\mathcal{R}7$  and Rule  $\mathcal{R}8$ .

(c) *Regulation over service requests:* By Rule  $\mathcal{R}9$ , an agent with official name  $N$ , certified by its enterprise director, can issue request for service  $S$  of enterprise  $E$  via message:

```
sr(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E))
```

if the payment  $P$  doesn't exceed its current budget and the request is authorized by its refining delta. If it is the case, the corresponding payment will be reduced from the sender's budget before the service request is forwarded.

By Rule  $\mathcal{R}10$ , only the certified server can receive a service request if the payment type is correct and the request is authorized by the server's local enterprise refining law delta. If this is the case, the two operations will be carried out: (1) the server's budget will increase by that payment, and (2) the request will be delivered to the server.

Otherwise, a service rejection message with the previous payment will be forwarded back to the client and the client will get the refund of that payment as in Rule  $\mathcal{R}11$ . Both Rule  $\mathcal{R}9$  and Rule  $\mathcal{R}10$  use the similar process as Rule  $\mathcal{R}7$  to check the permission of the request sending and receiving from the refining delta.

(d) *Limiting the power of refining deltas:* Finally,  $\mathcal{P}_C$  imposes some limitations on the possible effects of refining deltas, to ensure such things as that currencies cannot be forged. First, as has already been pointed out, the `protected` clause in the preamble of this law does not allow certain terms to be changed by deltas.

Second, by Rule  $\mathcal{R}12$ , this law would reject any recommendation by delta to forward certain messages, such as `grantBudget` and `giveCurrency` messages that might cause, effectively, currency to be forged. This is done because  $\mathcal{P}_C$  cannot depend on refining deltas not to violate these important properties that our law is responsible for.

## 5.2 Establishing Local Policies of Member-Enterprises

*Law  $\mathcal{P}_1$  of enterprise  $E_1$* : this law is formed by refining law  $\mathcal{P}_C$  via delta  $\overline{\mathcal{P}}_1$ , which is shown in Figure 5. As specified in the preamble of this delta, the controllers interpreting this law would be required to be certified by the CA identified by the public key `publicKey3`—as well as by the CA required by the superior law  $\mathcal{P}_C$ . Furthermore, the preamble specifies the address of agent, which is to be used as an audit-trail server under this law.

<p><i><math>\mathcal{P}</math>reamble:</i>  <code>law(name(<math>\mathcal{P}_1</math>),ca(publicKey3)) refines <math>\mathcal{P}_C</math>.</code>  <code>alias(e1Auditor,"e1Auditor@e1.com").</code></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}1</math>. <code>sent(X,giveCurrency(B,E),[Y,Ly]) :-</code>  <code>  role(directorOf(e1))@CS, do(permitS).</code>  <i>In this enterprise, only the enterprise director can give its own service currency to others.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}2</math>. <code>sent(X,sr(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E)),[Y,Ly]) :-</code>  <code>  do(permitS), do(deliver(Self,ThisGoal,e1Auditor)).</code>  <i>Authorize all the service requests. Furthermore, monitor all the service requests sent by the agents of this enterprise.</i></p> <p><math>\mathcal{R}3</math>. <code>arrived([X,Lx],sr(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E)),Y) :-</code>  <code>  do(permitA), do(deliver(Self,ThisGoal,e1Auditor)).</code>  <i>Authorize all the service requests. Furthermore, monitor all the service requests received by the servers of this enterprise.</i></p>
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**Fig. 5.** Law delta  $\overline{\mathcal{P}}_1$

By Rule  $\mathcal{R}1$ , law  $\mathcal{P}_1$  allows only the director of enterprise  $E_1$  to distribute currencies within the enterprise. No other agent can transfer its currencies to others.

Rules  $\mathcal{R}2$  and  $\mathcal{R}3$  ensure that copies of all the service requests sent by agents of  $E_1$  and those received by the servers of  $E_1$  will be sent to its own audit-trail server—`e1Auditor`.

*Law  $\mathcal{P}_2$  of enterprise  $E_2$* : this law is formed by refining law  $\mathcal{P}_C$  via delta  $\overline{\mathcal{P}}_2$ , which is shown in Figure 6. This law differs from  $\mathcal{P}_1$ , in the following respects: First, by Rule  $\mathcal{R}1$ , any agent in enterprise  $E_2$  can transfer part of any service currency it has to others, and any such currency movement will be audited by the enterprise’s auditor `e2Auditor`.

Also, by Rules  $\mathcal{R}2$  and  $\mathcal{R}3$ , agents of  $E_2$  are allowed to engaged in coalition activities only between 6:00PM to 8:00AM; where, by “coalition activity” we mean sending or receiving service requests.

<pre> Preamble:   law(name(P<sub>2</sub>),ca(publicKey4)) refines P<sub>C</sub>.   alias(e2Auditor," e2Auditor@e2.com").  R1. sent(X,giveCurrency(B,E),[Y,Ly]) :-     do(permitS), do(deliver(Self,ThisGoal,e2Auditor)).     Any agent in this enterprise can give part of its service currency to others and that currency movement     will be monitored by this enterprise. R2. sent(X,sr(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E)),[Y,Ly]) :-     clock(T)@CS, if (T &gt; 6:00PM; T &lt; 8:00AM) then do(permitS).     The agents of E<sub>2</sub> are allowed to send the coalition service requests only after the normal working     hour,namely, from 6:00PM to 8:00AM. R3. arrived([X,Lx],sr(from(N),service(S),payment(P,E)),Y) :-     clock(T)@CS, if (T &gt; 6:00PM; T &lt; 8:00AM) then do(permitA).     The servers of E<sub>2</sub> are allowed to receive and process the coalition service requests only after the     normal working hour, namely, from 6:00PM to 8:00AM. </pre>
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Fig. 6. Law delta  $\overline{P_2}$ 

## 6 Conclusions

This paper introduces a new, and fully implemented, regulatory mechanism for coalitions. The main contributions of this mechanism are as follows:

First, this mechanism is based on a very general view of the governance of coalitions, assuming that each coalition  $C$  is governed by a global policy  $P_C$ , and that each coalition member  $E_i$  is governed by its own policy  $P_i$ , which must conform to  $P_C$ .

Second, since it is based on LGI, our mechanism can support a wide range of highly dynamic (stateful) policies, and it enforces these policies in an efficient and decentralized manner.

Finally, our mechanism satisfies the following *flexibility* property:

Each internal policy  $P_i$  can be defined and changed independently of the internal policies of other coalition members, and without any knowledge of them.

Such a flexibility is important for several reasons. First, it provides each enterprise with the *autonomy* to define its own policy at will, subject only to the pre-agreed coalition policy  $P_C$ . Second, the mutual independence of the internal policies of member enterprises simplifies their formation and their evolution. Finally, this principle allows an individual enterprise to keep its own policy *confidential*, since policies of other enterprises do not depend on it.

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